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RECENT DECISIONS
TORTS - NEGLIGENCE AcTIoNs By FEDERAL PRISONERS AL-
LOWED UNDER THE FEDERAL TORT CLAIMs ACT. - Two separate
suits for personal injuries were brought by federal prisoners under
the Federal Tort Claims Act.' Respondent Winston alleged the
negligence of prison medical employees in failing to diagnose a
brain tumor, thereby delaying its removal and causing his eventual
blindness. Likewise, respondent Muniz alleged that the failure
of prison officials to prevent twelve inmates from assaulting him,
fracturing his skull and causing blindness in one eye constituted
negligence on their part. The district courts' dismissals of the
actions on the ground of sovereign immunity were reversed by the
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.2 The Supreme Court
affirmed, holding that a person under confinement in a federal
prison can sue the United States Government under the Federal
Tort Claims Act to recover damages for personal injuries, sustained
during confinement, by reason of the negligence of a government
employee. United States v. Muniz, 374 U.S. 150 (1963).
The common-law concept of sovereign immunity prevented a
private person from suing federal and state governments without
their consent. 3 Whether this concept had its basis in the "divine
right of Kings" theory or was a result of feudalism is a matter
of scholarly contention.4 Blackstone's rule, that the Crown was
immune from suits because no court can have jurisdiction over the
King,5 was the "universally received opinion" in the United States
by 1821.6
However, with the expansion of the federal government's
activities, the number of remediless wrongs multiplied. To cope
with this situation congress provided some relief by enacting
private bills.7 As time progressed, congress found itself sorely
burdened with investigating and passing upon substantial numbers
of these private claim bills." Such preoccupation was criticized
as an inefficient use of conkressional time and money. Coupled with
'28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671-80 (1958).2 Muniz v. United States, 305 F.2d 285 (2d Cir. 1962) (panel opinion,
2-1 decision; rehearing en banc, per curiam, 5-4 decision); Winston v.
United States, 305 F.2d 253 (2d Cir. 1962) (panel opinion, 2-1 decision;
rehearing en banc, 5-4 decision).
3Kawananakoa v. Polyblank, 205 U.S. 349, 353 (1907). See generally
PRossER, TORTS 770-72 (2d ed. 1955), and WRiGHT, THE FFDr.AL TORT
CLAIms AcT 1-2 (1957).4 Woody, Recovery By Federal Prisoners Under The Federal Tort
Claims Act, 36 WAsr. L. REv. 338, 345 (1961).
5 WIGHT, op. cit. supra note 3, at 2.6 Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 411-12 (1821) (dictum).
7 WRIGHT, op. cit. supra note 3, at 2-3.
8 United States v. Muniz, 374 U.S. 150, 154 (1963). The Court found
that between the Sixty-eighth and Seventy-eighth Congresses 2,000 or more
private claim bilfs were introduced per Congress.
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a resultant desire for organizational improvement was a desire to
avoid injustice to those having meritorious claims previously barred
by sovereign immunityY The problem was met in 1946 with the
passage of the Federal Tort Claims Act 1 [hereinafter referred
to as the FTCA] a culmination of "nearly thirty years of con-
gressional consideration." 1
Primarily, the FTCA granted to the district courts the ex-
clusive jurisdiction to hear suits based upon the negligence of
government employees in "circumstances where the United States,
if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance
with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred." 12
The government was to be liable for torts in the same manner and
to the same extent as a private individual "under like circum-
stances." 13 Congress expressly excluded thirteen types of claims
from the operation of the FTCA,' 4 thereby protecting the govern-
ment from liability that might seriously handicap efficient govern-
ment operations.Y5
The FTCA does not specifically state whether or not suits by
federal prisoners are allowed. Therefore, by application of the
maxim expressio unius 16 the exclusion of prisoners from the list of
exceptions would seem to mean that they are included within the
scope of the Act.17  However, this reasoning was, in effect, re-
jected by the Supreme Court in Feres v. United States,' where it
was held that a member of the armed forces could not sue under
the FTCA for injuries which "arise out of or are in the course
of activity incident to service." 19 Among the principal reasons for
so holding were the absence of an analogous or parallel liability
on the part of either an individual or a state; 20 the presence of a
9 Gelhorn & Lauer, Federal Liability For Personal And Property Damage,
29 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1325, 1329-30 (1954).
10 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671-80 (1958).
I1 Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 24 (1953).
1228 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1958).
13 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1958).
'428 U.S.C. § 2680 (1958), as amended, 28 U.S.C. § 2680 (Supp. IV,
1963).
15 United States v. Muniz, 374 U.S. 150, 163 (1963).
16 Expressio unius est exclusio alterius. "The expression of one thing
is the exclusion of another."1 71WRIG T, THE FEDERAL TORT CrAIMs Acr 30 (1957). See also Note,
Denial Of Prisoners' Claims Under The Federal Tort Claims Act, 63 YALE
L.J. 418, 420 (1954).
18 340 U.S. 135 (1950). Subsequent prisoner cases relying on the Feres
rationale also refused to apply this doctrine of statutory construction. See, e.g.,
Lack v. United States, 262 F.2d 167 (8th Cir. 1958) ; Jones v. United States,
249 F2d 864 (7th Cir. 1957).
19 Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 146 (1950).20 d. at 141-42. Since no individual has the power to mobilize a
private army, there is no liability "under like circumstances," as called for
by the FTCA in 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1958).
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comprehensive compensation system for service personnel; 21 and
the distinctively federal relationship of the soldier to his superiors
and the government, which should not be disturbed by state
laws. 22
The great majority of lower federal courts have denied re-
covery to prisoners, reasoning that the Feres case was sufficiently
analogous to the prisoner-jailer situation to be controlling' 3 It
was stated that the relationship of the soldier and federal prisoner
to the government were both "governed exclusively by federal
law." 24 Similarly, it was determined that allowing prisoners to
sue under the FTCA would hamper the government policy of
operating federal penal institutions uniformly, since the local law
would then have to be applied.25 It was further reasoned that
permission for prisoners to sue under the FTCA would establish
a new and novel liability, which Feres expressly refused to do.2 0
just as there was no analogous civil liability in the case of a
soldier,27 the phrase "under like circumstances" could not apply
to a federal prisoner because no private individual has the legal
right to hold another in penal servitude.28  Allowing such re-
coveries was seen as a threat to the maintenance of prison
discipline,29 and the presence of a statutory compensation fund
for prisoners working in prison industries3 was regarded as
analogous to the presence of a compensation scheme for the military
in Feres.3 1
Utilizing the Feres rationale, the lower federal courts almost
uniformly denied prisoner tort claims.3 2  Nor did this tendency
2 1 d. at 145.22 Id. at 142-44.
Under the FTCA the law of the place where the act or omission occurred
governs consequent liability. Therefore, allowing a soldier to sue under
the FTCA would subject him, involuntarily, to variations in state law and
would disturb a relationship which was distinctively federal in character,
since a soldier's relationship to the government is derived from federal
sources and governed by federal authority.
23 Lack v. United States, supra note 18; Jones v. United States, supra
note 18. Sigmon v. United States, 110 F. Supp. 906 (W.D. Va. 1953).
24 Lack v. United States, .rpra note 18, at 169.
25 Jones v. United States, supra note 18, at 866. This was regarded as
substantially similar to the Feres reasoning set forth in note 22, supra.
See also Sigrnon v. United States, supra note 23, at 908-11.2 6 Jones v. United States, supra note 18, at 866.
27 See note 22, supra.
28 Sigmon v. United States, supra note 23, at 910.
2 9 Ibid.
3018 U.S.C. §4126 (1958), as amended, 18 U.S.C. §4126 (Supp. IV
1963).
31 Sigmon v. United States, supra note 23, at 908.
32 In Lawrence v. United States, 193 F. Supp. 243 (N.D. Ala. 1961),
the court allowed recovery to a prisoner suing under the FTCA but dis-
tinguished the case from the ordinary prisoner suit. The prisoner was being
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abate when the Supreme Court seemingly limited the Feres impact
in two subsequent cases. 33  In Indian Towing Co. v. United
States,34 the Court allowed recovery under the FTCA for damages
suffered when a barge and tug ran aground due to the negligent
operation of a lighthouse by the Coast Guard. Limiting Feres
to its factual situation, the Court reasoned that employees of the
United States Government should exercise due care when they
cause reliance on their activities "in. the same manner and to the
same extent as a private individual. . .. ," 35 This was considered
as being within the "broad and just purpose" 36 of the FTCA.
In Rayonier, Inc. v. United States 3 7 the Court held the
United States liable under the FTCA for the negligence of its
Forest Service employees while fighting a fire. The Court stated
that the test of ,governmental liability under the Act was "whether
a private person would be responsible for similar negligence
under the laws of the state where the acts occurred." 38 The Court
also decided it should not read exceptions into the FTCA beyond
those provided' by congress.3 9
Although the federal courts, generally, held Feres controlling
even after these cases,40 a liberalizing trend was established. 41
This apparent divergence between the Supreme Court and the
lower courts ripened the issue for the Court's consideration of the
principal case.42
transported in a government truck driven by a civilian employee of the
United States Air Force. The court reasoned that the prisoner's claim was
against government employees who were completely disassociated from the
plaintiff's prisoner status.
However in an earlier suit for damages where a prisoner was injured
while under treatment for narcotics addiction in a federal hospital, the
court denied recovery since the prisoner was injured in a situation only
incidentally related to being a prisoner. Berman v. United States, 170 F.
Supp. 107 (E.D.N.Y. 1959).
33Rayonier, Inc. v. United States, 352 U.S. 315 (1957); Indian Towing
Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61 (1955).34 1ndian Towing Co. v. United States, supra note 33.
3 5 Id. at 64-65 (quoting from 28 U.S.C. §2674 (1958)).
36 Id. at 68-69.
37 Rayonier, Inc. v. United States, supra note 33.
38 Id. at 319.39 Id. at 320. It seems here that the Court again reverts to the expressio
uiius maxim.4 0The two circuit court decisions, Lack v. United States, 262 F.2d 167
(8th Cir. 1958) and Jones v. United States, 249 F.2d 864 (7th Cir. 1957),
were rendered subsequent to the Indian Towing Co. and Rayonier cases.
Both decisions considered Feres controlling since the federal prisoner situation
was regarded as more closely related to the military than to the situations
in Indian Towing Co. or Rayonier.
41Woody, Recovery By Federal Prisoners Under The Federal Tort
Claims Act, 36 WASH. L. Ray. 338, 350 n. 65 (1961).4 2 United States v. Muniz, 374 U.S. 150 (1963).
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Because of the important question in construction presented,
the Supreme Court scrutinized the legislative history of the FTCA
and found that congress intended to eliminate the burden imposed
by the substantial numbers of private claim bills. 43 Since claims
by federal prisoners were among those private bills, congress
appeared well aware of the problem presented by such claims. 44
Therefore, failure to include federal prisoners in the list of ex-
ceptions to the FTCA was regarded as evidence of a deliberate
intent by congress to allow prisoners' actions. 45
The Court had recourse to the plain import of statutory
language which it coupled with a study of those bills proposing
tort claims legislation from 1925 through 1946. It was found
that six bills were introduced to bar suits of prisoners. None
of these bills were passed or included in the FTCA.46 It was
also noted that reference was made by congress to the law of New
York, which had relaxed the rule of sovereign immunity and
had long allowed prisoner suits without detrimental or undesirable
effects on the prison system.47 In concluding that congress intended
to allow prisoner suits under the FTCA, the Court limited Feres
to its factual situation.48
Among the reasons set forth for not following Feres was
the existence here of an analogous form of liability, which was
absent in Feres.49 This analogous form of liability to the prisoner
existed because most states have allowed prisoners to recover
from their jailors, individually, for negligently caused injuries.50
Such liability also existed in some states which have allowed
prisoners' suits under a waiver of sovereignty.51 Moreover, since
Indian Towing Co. and Rayonier had extended the government's
responsibility to novel and unprecedented forms of liability, the
43 Id. at 154.44 Ibid. The Court found that between 1935 and 1946 congress passed
twenty-one private claim bills for federal prisoners. Thus, the much larger
number of these bills that must have been originally introduced added the
legislative burden.45 Id. at 156.
46 Ibid.471d. at 157 n. 12.
By 1946 it was well established that prisoner suits against New York
State were allowed. Paige v. New York, 269 N.Y. 352, 199 N.E. 617(1936); White v. New York, 260 App. Div. 413, 23 N.Y.S.2d 526 (3d
Dep't 1940), aff'd mern., 285 N.Y. 728, 34 N.E.2d 896 (1941).
The remedy was limited, somewhat, by the existence of a "civil death"
statute which precluded suit while still in prison. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 510;
Lipschultz v. New York, 192 Misc. 70, 78 N.Y.S.2d 731 (Ct. Cl. 1948).
See generally Leflar & Kantrowitz, Tort Liability Of The States,
29 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1363 (1954).
48 United States v. Muniz, 374 U.S. 150, 158-62 (1963).
49 d. at 159-60.
50 Ibid.; Woody, supra note 41, at 353 n. 83.
51 United States v. Muniz, supra note 48, at 160.
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argument against such an extension was rejected. 52  Likewise, the
presence of a compensation fund for prisoners was held not
necessarily to preclude prisoner suits under the FTCA.53  The
Court found the compensation scheme to be non-comprehensive.5 4
The government's contention that variations in state laws might
hamper uniform administration of federal prisons, as it was feared
they would with the military, was rejected. Admitting that prisoner
recoveries might be prejudiced to some extent by variations in
state law, the Court regarded no recovery at all as a more serious
prejudice to the prisoner's rights.55  In this connection, it is
interesting to consider the desirability of spreading tort liability
in the governmental area.5"
The impact of the principal case is, in some respects, clear.
It sets to rest a controversy that has been present in the federal
courts since the passage of the FTCA in 1946. It strengthens
the prospects of compliance with the standards of care owed by the
Bureau of Prisons to federal prisoners,57 and provides them with
much needed relief.58
The holding that prisoners can sue the government may,
indeed, prove to be the catalyst necessary for added wai- ers of
sovereign immunity on the part of the state. Finally, the
unanimity of the Court's decision indicates its firm determination
to liberally construe the FTCA, a trend begun by the Indian
Towing Co. and Rayonier cases.
WILLS - DECEASED RESIDUARY LEGATEE'S SHARE HELD NOT
TO PASS BY WAY OF INTESTACY WHERE IT IS CLEARLY MANIFESTED
THAT SURVIVING RESIDUARY LEGATEES SHOULD SHARE IN THE
RESIDUUM- In this proceeding the petitioner requested the Court
52 United States v. Muniz, supra note 48, at 159.
53 Id. at 160.
54 Ibid. Only those federal prisoners engaged in Federal Prison In-
dustries (18% of all federal prisoners) were coyered by this prison com-
pensation scheme. Woody, Recovery by Federal Prisoners Under The
Federal Tort Claims Act, 36 WAsH. L. REv. 338, 351 (1961).
55 United States v. Muniz, supra note 48, at 162. Looking to New
York's experience in allowing prisoner suits, the Court found no adverse
effects on either prison regulation or prison discipline.56McNiece & Thornton, The Federal Tort Claims Act And Its Applica-
tion To Military Personnel, 5 VAND. L. REv. 57, 66-67 (1951-52).
5718 U.S.C. §.4042 (1958).
CSSupra note 48. From a sociological viewpoint the relief is important
since "a permanently disabled prisoner with no financial resources cannot
be expected to return to society as a useful and well-behaved person. On
the contrary, he may well revert to crime in an attempt to survive ... "
Note, Denial Of Prisoners' Claims Under The Federal Tort Claims Act,
63 YALE L.J. 418, 425 (1954).
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